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Pricing and Welfare in 
Urban Transportation 
MASATOSHI A. ABE 
Dr. A be is Assistant Professor in the College of Business Admin-
istration at Marquette UniveTSity. He holds a B.A. degree in 
Mathematics from St. Norbert College, a M .S. degree in Mathe-
matics from Boston College, and a Ph.D. degree in Economics 
from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Since I969 he has 
been teach ing microeconomic theory and statistics at iV1.arquette 
University. He is a member of the transportation research group 
and is currently interested in optimal pricing, particularly in re-
lation to economic efficiency and equity. 
T HE purpose of this pa per is to review briefly the pricing rule applied to public facilities and to services such as transporta-
tion, then to examine the current pricing practices and some re-
sultant problems in transporta tion , and finally to present some re-
sults of our empirical investigation of the mass transit operation 
in the Milwaukee area. 
PRICING RULE 
The pncmg rule of public facilities and services should be 
aimed at increasing the economic welfare of society by achieving 
efficient allocation of resources and equitable distribution of in-
come. Pricing in transportation should, therefore, be used as a 
possible means to achieve a balanced and smooth flow of traffic and 
to achieve distributional equity. 
Therefore in order to give a meaningful discussion of the pric-
ing policy of public facilities and services such as transportation, a 
model is needed which incorporates all three strands of economic 
disciplines: welfare economics, public finance, and regulatory 
institutions. 
As it is well known, congestion results from not using a proper 
price mechanism: too Iowa price is charged so that an excessive 
number of road users is on the roads . This would imply inefficient 
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allocation of road users, for congestion results from too many users 
during the peak hours and fewer users during the off-peak hours. 
If the peak-hour users are persuaded to switch to the off-peak 
hours, the problems of congestion may be solved. This is where 
the price mechanism comes in. (The fact that people have to use 
roads during the peak hours to get to work is ignored here.) A rela-
tively higher price charged during the peak hours and a relatively 
lower price during the off-peak hours would accomplish the trans-
fer of some of the peak-period users to the off-peak periods. 
The proper use of the price mechanism may, therefore, solve 
the problem of congestion, but it will create another formidable 
one-the problem of inequity. A higher price charged to the peak-
period users reduces congestion but at the same time prevents the 
poor from using the roads. A situation may be conceived where the 
peak-period road use is limited only to the rich, and the poor are 
forced to give up the use of their automobiles in favor of mass 
transit. Therefore, the choice of various combinations of efficiency 
and equity must be faced, and a pricing rule is needed to balance 
efficiency and distributional equity. 
It is well accepted in this respect that price should be set equal 
to marginal social cost in order to maximize economic welfare of 
society with balanced efficiency and distributional equity. Accord-
ing to the marginal cost pricing rule, the charge for the service 
of the road should measure the value of resources used up in pro-
viding that service. The rule suggests, therefore, that a toll should 
be levied on users during congested hours, and that these tolls must 
be such that the private cost of the trip is equal to its marginal 
social cost. 
DEPARTURE FROM MARGINAL COST PRICING 
AND CURRENT PRICING PRACTICES 
Marginal cost pricing yields maximum social welfare only 
under very restricted circumstances. There must be no market 
distortions and the economy must be a perfectly competitive one 
where all market sectors follow the marginal cost pricing rule. 
Under the current pricing practices in transportation systems, 
then, what is required is not a price that is set equal to marginal 
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social cost, but a price that deviates systematically from marginal 
social cost. This departure of price from marginal social cost is 
necessary to increase the economic welfare . of society not just by 
achieving efficiency but also by establishing equity. 
Three situations are now considered in relation to a two-travel 
modes model of private automobiles and bus transit where prices 
are required to deviate from marginal social cost. 
Peaking of Demand 
The demand for transportation service varies substantially 
from hour to hour, day to day, or season to season. According to 
the marginal cost pricing rule, the price for the peak-hour travel 
should be set higher than the price for off-peak travel, reflecting a 
widely varying marginal social cost. Keeping price continuously 
equal to marginal social cost as it varies when the demand for travel 
changes is, however, not possible because of administrative diffi-
culties. The current pricing practice is to keep a single price 
throughout the demand cycle. Under this practice the optimal price 
that maximizes the welfare for society is not the price which is 
equal to marginal social cost, but a price set between the marginal 
cost of the peak-hour travel and the marginal cost of the off-pe;:tk 
hour travel. 1 
Scale Economies and Financing 
The idea behind marginal cost pricing was to set user charges 
equal to marginal social cost and thus to confront the user with the 
true cost of his choice when he makes it. But user charge may not 
be large enough to pay back the full investment cost in the facilities 
he uses. This can often happen when there exist scale economies. 
It should be understood that the rule of self-liquidation as a gen-
eral guide to efficient operation and investment must be put aside 
in the presence of scale economies. In a case where the deficit limit 
is imposed, the optimal price should be set higher than marginal 
social cost.2 
1. Herbert Mohring, "The Peak Load Problem with Increasing Returns and 
Pricing Constraints," American Economic Review, Vol. 60, NO.4 (September 1970), 
P·700. 
2 . Mohring, "The Peak Load Problem," p. 697; William Baumol and David 
Bradford, "Optimal Departure from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic 
Review, Vol. 60, NO.3 (June 1970), p. 270. 
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As shown later in connection with the operation of the Mil-
waukee bus transit system, it is extremely important to take into 
account scale economies and diseconomies in order to understand 
the financial problems of transportation operations. 
"Highway biased" Financing and Underpriced 
Private Automobile Travel 
It has been charged that in deciding between private and mass 
transportation, the American consumer has been presented for 
years and years with a market heavily rigged in favor of use of his 
own car. In this connection public policy has been criticized. 
It should be noted, however, that public policy is not necessarily 
biased in favor of private automobiles and against mass transporta-
tion simply because of heavy governmental investment in highways 
in metropolitan areas. What truly deserves criticism is the method 
of financing highways and the consequent underpricing or sub-
sidization of the peak-hour central-business-district-oriented private 
automobile use. 
A public mass transit system must recover most of its cost from 
charges imposed on those who ride in the peak hours, since other 
users are relatively few. In other words, the peak-hour users of 
mass transit system are asked to pay the full cost of maintaining the 
system. In contrast, a freeway system has its cost spread over a 
larger group, since freeways tend to peak less sharply. 
Moreover, in most cases the only price the users of highways are 
aware of paying for their use of highways is the gasoline tax which 
is only a small part of the true cost. The peak-hour CBD-oriented 
private automobile users are heavily subsidized from gasoline taxes 
and other user charges collected from the off-peak period automo-
bile users and those who use non urban highways.3 
Under a situation where automobile use is underpriced, the 
optimal price for mass transit system use is not the one equal to 
marginal social cost, but rather the price which is less than marginal 
social cost, and, under some circumstances, the price which is less 
than average social cost. In other words, under the current pricing 
practice of underpricing automobile use, mass transit systems 
and/or mass transit users should be subsidized.4 
3. Dick Netzer, Economics and Urban Problems: Diagnoses and Prescriptions 
(New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 143. 
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This is not to say "Charge mass transit below its marginal social 
cost, because private automobile is priced below its marginal social 
cost." It is not an argument of "two wrongs make a right." It is an 
argument based on the theoretical formulation of social welfare 
maximization: a bus subsidy will improve economic welfare when 
automobiles are underpriced. 
In summary, the above three cases can be compared with the 
ideal case (price equals marginal social cost) as follows: 
1. No price differential between peak and off-peak periods 
Price> marginal social cost of the peak period 
2. Financial constraint case 
Price> marginal social cost 
3. Underpricing of automobile case 
Bus fare < marginal social cost 
or bus fare < average cost (subsidy is justified) 
SUBSIDIZATION OF MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM 
The above discussion has demonstrated distorted pricing prac-
tices of the current transportation system and remedies-the "sec-
ond best" pricing to maximize social welfare. 
One frequently discussed "solution" to urban congestion is to 
charge the automobile users considerably more, in view of the fact 
that it is automobiles that cause congestion, pollution, and other 
intolerable nuisances. 
The imposition of higher charges on the use of private auto-
mobiles may persuade automobile users to abandon their cars and 
ride the public mass transit system. But, as mentioned before, 
under such a pricing scheme the lower-income people are victim-
ized. The upper-income people would still use their cars in the 
face of higher charges and might even benefit from the opportunity 
to be able to use less congested highways. In other wo.rds, charging 
the automobile users more may well increase the welfare of the 
high-income people but is almost certain to lower the welfare of 
the low-income people. 
In view of the inequity associated with such a proposal to solve 
4. Roger Sherman, "Congestion Interdependence and Urban Transportation 
Fares," Econometrica, Vol. 39, NO.3 (May 1971), pp. 565-576. Also his "Subsidies 
to Relative Urban Congestion," in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 
6, NO.1 (January 1972), pp. 21-31. 
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urban traffic congestion by setting higher charges on the private 
automobile users, proposals have been advanced to subsidize the 
mass transit system ( or users) and even to provide a free transit. In 
recent years there has been growing interest in the reduction of 
fares as an incentive to use mass transportation systems, and also to 
help provide ghetto residents with accessibility to job centers. Mas-
sive investments in rapid transit facilities are being proposed as 
a solution to the urban transportation problems, for it is argued 
that improved transit service will divert travelers from auto to 
public transit, thereby reducing highway congestion, parking prob-
lems, and air pollution, as well as decreasing the need for new 
highway construction so that land takings and their attendant 
disruptions can be reduced. 
Kraft, Domencich, and Valette investigated the problem of free 
transit.5 Their principal conclusion was that while free transit 
contributes to solution of urban transportation problems, im-
proved transit service is generally a more efficient means of solving 
these problems. Their study showed that transit ridership was more 
responsive to improvements in service than to reductions in fares; 
and reductions in access times to and from the transit station, as 
well as transfer and waiting times, are likely to be particularly 
important. 
But, as these three invpstigators noted, to identify and evaluate 
the effectiveness of any transit subsidy program, a solid under-
standing of the b'ehavior of urban commuters is needed. A fully 
satisfactory statistical demand function which analyzes the behavior 
of urban commuters in relation to their reactions to performance 
variables of a transportation system has not been developed, mainly 
because of the paucity of data. 
In the following some results of an empirical investigation into 
the demand and supply relations of the Milwaukee area bus transit 
system are presented, using available data. 
A CASE STUDY: THE MILWAUKEE BUS TRANSIT OPERATION 
Like virtually all mass transportation systems in this country, 
5. Gerald Kraft, Thomas Domencich, and Thomas Valette, "Estimation of 
Urban Passenger Travel Behavior: An Economic Demand Model," Highway Re· 
search Record No. 2)8 (1968). 
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the transit system in the Milwaukee area has been caught in an 
unending cycle-continuing decline in patronage, constantly rising 
costs of labor and equipment, and an almost periodic increase in 
bus fares. There is a reasonable fear that this cycle will lead to the 
ultimate extinction of mass transit service in the Milwaukee area 
if it is allowed to continue unchecked. 
The investigation reported here finds that a lowered bus fare 
together with improved service will substantially increase transit 
patronage. This in turn will reduce the cost of operating bus 
transit as a consequence of the existence of economies of scale. Also 
investigation into the socioeconomic characteristics of United 
States urban mass transit riders has shown that the majority of the 
transit riders are captive riders-riders with no means of transpor-
tation other than mass transit.6 
These findings substantiate the contention that mass transit 
service should be substantially improved-fares as well as services-
to attract more automobile users to mass transit and to provide 
better transportation services to the poor. The empirical founda-
tions of these conclusions are discussed in detail below. 
Demand for Transit Service in the Milwaukee Area 
The df!mand- side of the transit service was first examined to 
find out whether or not a relation exists between the quality of 
service and the level of transit patronage. 
Time series data obtained from the Milwaukee and Suburban 
Transport Corporation for the period of 1955-1970 was used.7 
Some results of our regression equations are as follows: 
Log Xl = 9.5210 + 0.8947 log X 2 - 3.0809 log X 4 - 0.2046 log X5 (1) 
(8.0084) (- 3.6102) (- 2.8385) 
R2 = 0.9954 
Log Xl = 9.7038 - 2.2141 log X 2 + 3.06°3 log X3 - 0.2367"log X5 (2) 
(- 2.197 1) (3. 187°) (- 3.277°) 
R2 = 0.9948 
6. Masatoshi Abe and Kumares Sinha, "Pricing and Quality of Service in Urban 
Mass Transportation," Journal of American Society of Civil Engineers, forthcoming. 
7. Milwaukee and Suburban Transportation Corporation. Annual Report, 
each year 1955-1970. 
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Xl = the number of revenue passengers 
X 2 = bus miles of route coverage 
Xa = bus hours of service 
X4 = headway factors 
X5 = average fare 
R2 = coefficient of determination 
and numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The results are statistically significant with high R2'S and t-
statistics. It should be noted that the signs of estimated coefficients 
are correct-or what would be expected-with exception of X 2 in 
equation 2; negative signs of X5 indicate that a rising fare has in-
deed reduced the patronage volume, while a negative sign of X 4 
and a positive sign of X5 imply that a faster and wider service of 
trar.sit operation would increase the ridership. We would expect 
a positive sign from X 2 , which would suggest that a wider coverage 
of transit service would increase the patronage. The sign of X is 
negative in equation 2. However, this is due to the fact that Xa, bus 
hours, another service variable representing transit coverage, was 
used in the same equation in addition to X 2 , and that the effect 
of X2 is overshadowed by Xa. 
It should be noted that the contribution of X 5 , bus fare , is not 
as great as the contribut~ns of the other service variables. Since 
regression analysis was applied in the logarithmic forms, each co-
efficient represents the coefficient of demand elasticity of a respec-
tive variable. Therefore, a 1 percent reduction in bus fare, for 
example, will increase the ridership only by 0.2 percent, while 
1 percent reduction in headway factors will increase the patronage 
volume by 3.08 percent. 
In sum, the implications of these regression equations are ob-
vious: the transit patronage in the Milwaukee area can be increased 
by improving transit services (coverage and speed) and by reducing 
bus fares. 
Supply of Transit Service: Economies of Scale 
The supply side of transit service was then explored to find the 
effect of changes in the service variables on the cost of providing 
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transit service. The cost per unit service, i.e ., cost per bus mile, may 
be critically dependent upon service variables which affect patron-
age volumes. The crucial point here is the existence of economies 
or diseconomies of scale in transit operation . If deteriorating serv-
ice and a resultant reduction in transit patronage should yield an 
operation with a higher cost per unit, it would indicate that the 
transit company was suffering from diseconomies of scale in transit! 
operation. To explore the existence of scale economies, Yj , oper-
ating cost per bus mile deflated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
consumer index of transportation, was plotted against Xl ' the 
number of revenue passengers. The resulting curve was U-shaped. 
To confirm this, the following regression equation was tested: 
Yl = 13.7003 - 0.1362 Xl + 0.0072 X21 R2 = 0.8351 (3) 
(- 8.0427) (7. 8911) 
The result is statistically significant and shows that the curve is 
U-shaped. The U-shaped curve indicates that scale economies exist 
in the bus transit operation. It should be noted that since around 
1960 the transit company in the Milwaukee area has been operating 
in the range of diseconomies of scale. It can be argued, therefore, 
that the further reduction in the number of patronage will con- . 
sequently raise the unit operating cost of transit. 
A simple diagrammatic presentation will clarify this point. 
Figure 1 shows the U-shaped average cost curve and three demand 
curves. Considering the U-shaped cost curve of the transit system, 
increased fares and deteriorating services have shifted the demand 
to the left from Dl to D2 , thus raising the average cost of operating 
the transit system. Subsidies to the transit users or to the transit 
system, and other measures of improving transit service, would en-
courage the transit use by shifting the demand back from D2 to D j 
and to D3 as the analysis of the demand function for bus transit 
indicates. Improved transit service may shift upward the average 
cost (AC) curve, but the final outcome is most likely to trace such 
points as A, B, and C. An increased number of transit users will 
reduce the average cost of operating the transit system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article started out by stating that the pricing rule of public 
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of demand and average cost relationship 
facilities and services such as transportation should be aimed at 
maximizing economic welfare of society by achieving not only effi-
ciency in resource allocation but also distributional equity. For 
this reason the marginal cost pricing rule has been proposed: charge 
of the service of the road should reflect the value of the resources 
used up in providing that service. 
Then the fact that the present pricing practices necessitated 
the optimal price level to deviate from marginal social cost was 
discussed. That is, the present situation is in the area of the "sec-
ond best." In the face of the underpriced private automobiles, it 
was argued, therefore, that the subsidization of mass transit systems 
was justified. It was emphasized that price for mass transit should 
not be below its marginal social cost simply because the automobile 
users are paying a price below marginal social cost. A subsidy is 
required for mass transit in order to increase economic welfare of 
society. 
The case study of the bus transit service in the Milwaukee area 
has shown that improved bus service-lower fares as well as wider 
~\ 
c. 
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and faster coverage which would be affected by subsidies-will not 
only attract more commuters from automobiles to bus transit, but 
in doing so will also reduce the average operating cost of bus 
service as a result of utilization of economies of scale that exist in 
transit operation. 
In view of the fact that the majority of transit users are captive 
riders, it was argued, therefore, that in order to rescue the deficit 
ridden bus transit operation in the city of Milwaukee, massive 
subsidies or even a government take-over of transit operation is a 
highly recommended measure. This measure is proposed because 
it will increase the economic welfare of the community. 
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